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How To Avoid Another Banking Crisis 
Economics Team 
Judged Best In U.S. 
The Harding University Economics Team has 
captured the national championship for the fourth 
time in the Students in Free Enterprise (SIPE) 
competition in New Orleans, La., July 9-10. The 
student team and faculty sponsor, Dr. Don Diffine, 
were awarded a first place trophy and a check for 
$3,000 at the awards banquet. 
The competition, which was hosted by the 
Associates for Free Enterprise and co-sponsored by 
the National Free Enterprise Center in Boliver, 
Mo., involved more than 90 colleges and univer-
sities and some 4,000 students during 1983-84. The 
national SIPE competition brought 18 regional 
winners together for two days of intensive com-
petition. Forty judges from business and cor-
porations across the United States evaluated each 
finalist. 
Team members include Byron Carlock of 
Blytheville, Ark., Glenda Collier of Memphis, 
Tenn., De,bbie Garrett of Brookston, Ind., Bruce 
Picker of Searcy, Ark., Ellen Reid of Sugar Land, 
Texas, Mel Sansom of Pensacola, Fla., Jeff Ten-
nyson of Harrison, Ark. and Kevin Thompson of 
San Diego, Calif. 
Two of the team's projects drew special mention 
- a "Free Market Calendar" and the Personalized 
Employee Economic Program (PEEP). The PEEP 
program was designed to assist employees to 
become more knowledgeable and aware of the 
economic system in which they work. This year's 
championship, combined with national trophies in 
1980, 1981 and 1982, establishes Harding as the 
winningest team in the country. Harding was 
runnerup in 1978 and 1983. 
by 
Catherine England 
Policy Analyst 
THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION 
The recent problems at Continental Illinois Bank and 
Trust Company seem to have raised the specter of 1930s-
style crashes and bank runs. A number of editorialists 
and news commentators point to the near-failure of the 
nation's ninth largest bank as "proof' that a deregulated 
banking system would not work. 
For consumers of banking services and the econom! as 
a whole, however, this message fails to identify the true 
culprit in the Continental Illinois debacle. The seeds of 
Continental's fate were sown long ago when the bank's 
management decided to invest in a fairly concentrated, 
potentially volatile loan portfolio. 
More important, these investment decisions were 
made possible, even encouraged, by the existing system 
of federal deposit insurance and regulatory oversight. 
Until the real causes of Continental's troubles are ad-
dressed, other banks can be expected to stumble and 
even collapse. To correct these problems, a greatly ex-
panded reliance on market forces is needed. 
THE CURRENT SYSTEM'S 
WEAKNESSES 
The 1933 and 1934 laws that were designed to 
regulate, and restore confidence in, the nation's banking 
system bear a large share of the responsibility for the 
problems facing the financial services industry today. 
This is particularly true of federal deposit insurance. 
These insurance practices actually create a "moral 
hazard" - they encourage insured depository in-
stitutions to take additional risks. As a result, they are a 
potentially destabilizing force within the industry. 
There are two problems with practices at the Federal 
Deposit Ir:surance Corporation (FDIC). First, while the 
private insurance industry attempts to adjust premiums 
to reflect the. risk presented by the insured, the FDIC 
charges each insured bank at the same rate - a set 
percentage of its total domestic deposits - regardless of 
how well or how poorly the institution is run. 
Second, federal regulators traditionally have protected 
deposits exceeding the legally insured limit (currently 
$100,000)by arranging the mergers of failing institutions 
if at all possible. The acquiring bank was then made 
responsible for all deposit liabilities of the acquired 
institution. 
These policies removed many of the disincentives for 
taking on excessive . risk generally faced by bank 
managers. Because bank management did not pay a 
higher premium to the FDIC when it invested in a risky 
loan portfolio, there was no explicit penalty for such 
behavior. Consequently, any additional profits realized, 
if the loans paid off, accrued solely to the bank. Nor have 
large depositors, whose funds theoretically are at risk, 
had a strong incentive to discipline risk-loving bankers. 
Until recently their depositors had good reason to feel 
almost as secure as their counterparts with accounts 
containing only a few hundred dollars. 
Because the system of deposit insurance provided no 
direct means for discouraging excessive risk-taking, 
regulation of the industry has been viewed as an im-
portant mechanism for controlling the activities of 
banks, and hence, the risk exposure of the federal 
government. Thus, the Depression-era banking 
legislation not only sought to insure the safety of 
deposits, but also attempted to limit the competition 
engaged in by banks, thereby minimizing the number of 
possible failures. 
As a result, regulations arose limiting the interest that 
could be paid depositors, the range of services that could 
be offered by a bank, and the type of assets in which a 
bank could invest its funds . State regulations, mean-
while, have often limited the ability of banks to establish 
branches through which they could gather deposits and 
expand customer service. 
Many of these 1930s efforts to provide stability have 
proved to have been misguided. Historical hindsight as 
well as additional experience with rapidly changing 
market conditions have shown that such restrictions are 
contributing to current problems. For example, the 
interest rate restrictions established during the 
Depression to limit the competition for deposits proved 
almost fatal to many depository institutions in recent 
years when sustained inflation rates led depositors to 
search for financial instruments paying a market rate of 
return. 
Banks and thrift institutions found themselves unable 
to compete as money market mutual funds offered even 
relatively small savers significantly higher returns. 
Similarly, savings and loan associations were seriously 
weakened by statutory requirements that their loan 
portfolios be devoted almost exclusively to long-term 
home mortgages. Unable to diversify, savings and loans 
were forced to bear an inordinate degree of risk, par-
ticularly during the period when interest rates were 
moving steadily upward. 
Most recently, Illinois branching laws limiting 
Continental to a single office have been criticized as a 
potential contributor to the bank's difficulties. Rather 
than being able to finance its growth through expanding 
its base of small depositors, Continental was forced to 
enter the higher-cost market for large, uninsured 
deposits. The result was not only higher costs, but also a 
more volatile deposit base. 
Thus, as economic and technological changes have 
forced market responses that dictate some degree of 
deregulation, concern has grown over the role the FDIC 
plays in encouraging risk-taking among depository 
institutions. Recognizing the problems inherent in the 
existing system, and concerned that deregulation be 
allowed to proceed so that similar troubles may be 
avoided in the future, William Isaac, Chairman of the 
FDIC, has devised a two-part plan for introducing 
additional market discipline into the system. 
EFFORTS TO REFORM THE SYSTEM 
Isacc's first step was to serve notice to depositors with 
accounts exceeding $100,000 that they could no longer 
count on the FDIC to bail them out in the event of a 
failure. When Penn Square Bank in Oklahoma was 
allowed to fail in July 1982, a number of large depositors, 
including Continental Illinois, were surprised to find 
themselves left to sustain significant losses. During early 
1984, the FDIC continued this course by letting large 
depositors stand in line with other general creditors 
awaiting liquidation of failed banks' assets, despite the 
fact that mergers were arranged with healthy in-
stitutions. 
In addition, Isaac has been advocating congressional 
action to allow the introduction of risk-related 
premiums. He has argued that all banks should be 
assigned to one of three risk categories and that their 
total yearly premiums should, to some degree, reflect the 
competitive risk the institutions represent to the in-
surance fund. 
These policy changes are moves in the right direction. 
The reaction of the federal banking authorities to the 
Continental Illinois scare, however, has been a retreat in 
the FDIC's efforts to introduce market discipline into 
bank management. And the fact that Continental came 
so close to failing has raised anew in the minds of many 
an unfounded fear that a less regulated banking system 
would somehow prove unstable. 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE 
CONTINENTAL ILLINOIS DECISION 
Events at Continental Illinois in early May demon-
strated how well the FDIC's efforts were working. Isaac's 
actions during the past two years had convinced 
depositors with accounts exceeding $100,000 that they 
could no longer rely on an automatic federal bail-out. 
But when many of these depositors viewed their funds at 
Continental as being a risk and began behaving 
rationally by withdrawing them, the federal banking 
authorities stepped in. To stem the flow of funds, the 
FDIC and the Federal Reserve System guaranteed that 
all depositors and other creditors of Continental would 
be made whole regardless of the cost. 
In taking this step, the federal banking regulators, in 
effect, created a two-tiered banking system. They appear 
to have placed the nation's largest banks above the new 
market disciplines that have been introduced, thus 
providing these banks with a significant advantage in 
attracting funds that was not provided to their smaller 
competitors. 
Over the past two years, depositors with accounts 
exceeding $100,000 in smaller banks increasingly have 
been forced to bear a risk that funds placed in a poorly 
run bank may be lost. This has been a change for the 
better. The threat that the larger, more sophisticated 
depositors will move their accounts if exposed to ex-
cessive risk is potentially much more effective than any 
regulatory action could be in curbing excessive risk-
taking. 
With the Continental decision, however, federal 
regulators placed the nation's larger banks outside this 
new market discipline rule. Depositors with accounts of 
more than $100,000 in very large banks need not worry 
about their funds being at risk. With their sweeping 
guarantees at Continental, the FDIC and the Federal 
Reserve Board have removed the incentive for depositors 
to monitor the behavior of bank managers - at least at . 
some banks. 
As a result, the message sent by the Continental 
decision has potentially far-reaching consequences. It 
may do more to encourage concentration of the U.S. 
banking industry than deregulation could. In fact, under 
a deregulated system with market discipline applying 
equally to all banks, smaller banks would have certain 
advantages in attracting deposits. Smaller banks would 
be less likely to establish subsidiaries through which to 
offer a broad range of financial services. Because these 
banks would probably remain more concerned with 
narrow banking interests, they could be more easily 
monitored by their large depositors. 
In addition, any one large depositor could be expected 
to exert greater influence on the behavior of individuals 
managing a smaller bank. But, other considerations 
remaining equal, there would be little point in taking the 
trouble to monitor a small bank now that implicit 100 
percent insurance has been provided depositors in the 
larger banks. The result of the government's decisions 
concerning Continental Illinois will almost certainly be a 
flow of deposits exceeding $100,000 to the nation's 
biggest banks. 
A bank's growth to a size which makes it "too large to 
be allowed to fail" thus becomes an important asset. 
Large banks, whose status might be unclear in the event 
of pending failure, may well attempt to grow rapidly, 
thereby guaranteeing their own future existence and 
share of large depositors. Such efforts could trigger a 
"growth at all costs" policy in some banks, increasing 
the risks these managers are willing to undertake. The 
result would be a potentially weaker, increasingly un-
stable banking system requiring ever increasing 
government guarantees. 
ADVANTAGES OF A MARKET SYSTEM 
Attempts to protect the financial industry and the 
economy from the shocks of a large bank's failure, 
therefore, create incentives that could lead to increasing 
instability and additional government involvement. This 
repeats the whole cycle of excessive regulation, leading to 
unnecessary risk exposure and ever more instability. 
The escape from this dilemma is a deregulated, 
market-disciplined banking system. Existing weaknesses 
within the banking system merely require that the steps 
toward that environment be well considered and 
carefully taken. It is crucial to the success of a 
deregulated financial industry that federal deposit in-
surance incorporate market discipline to the broadest 
extent possible. Ultimately, the system should be 
privatized. 
First, blanket guarantees, like that given Continental; 
should not be available - regardless of the bank's size. 
Should a run by the large depositors of a particular bank 
become a threat, some orderly means of payment by 
federal regulators could surely be devised that would 
prevent the panic from spreading to other institutions. 
Even an announced policy of guaranteeing, say, 70 to 
80 perce11t of deposits in excess of $100,000 would be 
better than the Continental decision. Such a policy 
would, first, ensure a degree of market discipline at large 
banks, as depositors were forced to bear a certain 
amount of risk. In addition, a demand for private deposit 
insurance might be generated by those depositors who 
stood to lose a portion of their funds. 
Second, Congress should allow the FDIC to introduce 
risk-related premiums. While the risk of failure 
presented by a particular institution is of an admittedly 
subjective nature, private firms regularly make such 
judgments. The safety of bank stocks as an investment, 
the large, negotiable certificates of deposit offered by 
banks, and at least some portions of a depository's loan 
portfolios are regularly scrutinized by a wide range of 
private individuals and firms, including investment 
counselors and private consultants. 
The FDIC should be allowed to purchase this in-
formation to compare with the assessments of its own 
and other federal bank examiners in assigning banks to 
risk categories. The lack of expertise among the federal 
regulators when compared with their private sector 
counterparts is especially apparent where loans to 
particular, specialized industries are concerned. For 
instance, the FDIC cannot be expected to evaluate a loan 
portfolio containing a large percentage of energy Joans 
nearly as efficiently as can private analysts who specialize 
in appraising energy securities. 
These composite FDIC risk classifications also should 
be made public. While many will argue that such in-
formation could serve to destabilize the industry by 
causing large shifts of funds out of banks placed in the 
more risky categories, it is exactly this threat that will 
serve most effectively to encourage more prudent 
behavior among bankers. 
Gradually the maximum deposit covered by federal 
deposit insurance should be reduced. This would en-
courage the development of private deposit insurance 
alongside, if not in place of, federally provided in-
surance. Private deposit insurance would benefit the 
economy in general and consumers of banking services in 
particular. 
For example, private providers of deposit insurance 
would be much more responsive to early indications that 
an insured depository institution was taking on ad-
ditional risk. The decision to invest in a ·highly con-
centrated, potentially volatile loan portfolio would 
undoubtedly be penalized from the beginning, regardless 
of how promising such loans might appear initially. 
In addition, private insurers would have much more 
flexibility in responding to the risk presented by an 
insured institution. The development of a new line of 
financial services might be permitted without an increase 
in premiums if the bank first raised additional equity 
capital. 
Broadly based deregulation of the banking industry is, 
therefore, not necessarily inconsistent with stability, 
safety, and the security of depositors' funds. Ultimately 
required is an increased reliance on and willingness to 
accept additional market discipline of the banking 
industry - including risk-based premiums and, 
eventually, private deposit insurance. 
CONCLUSION 
The troubles at Continental Illinois and other banks 
do not stem from deregulation. They come from the 
regulatory and deposit insurance system. 
In some cases, regulations designed in the 1930s to 
limit competition have failed to protect banks and, 
instead, left them dangerously exposed when they were 
unable to respond to rapidly changing economic con· 
ditions. In other instances, regulators have found they 
were unable to prevent excessive risk-taking activities 
because of inadequate or perverse incentives provided by 
the tools at their disposal. 
The answer to today's banking problems is not ad-
ditional regulation or more powerful regulators, which 
would only generate a future crisis as market conditions 
changed more rapidly than regulatory behavior. What 
U.S. banking needs is more reliance on market discipline 
and less on regulation. 
Federal banking authorities should once again 
establish that the funds of large depositors are at risk, 
regardless of the size of the bank in which they are 
placed. The FDIC should be allowed to apply risk-based 
premiums, using information and assessments available 
in the private sector to assist in assigning risk categories. 
Finally, the size of deposit covered should be reduced 
gradually. This would increase the market pressure from 
depositors, which would create stronger incentives for 
prudent banking behavior and the development of a 
market for private deposit insurance. 
Only when federal authorities begin to understand and 
use the power of market discipline can deregulation 
proceed in an orderly fashion. 
Reprinted with permission from The Backgrounder, a 
June 22, 1984 publication of The Heritage Foundation, 
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